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Abstract
Online primaries are widely considered as the most inclusive and accessible form of intra-party decision-
making. However, their openness also carries the risk of strengthening parties’ leadership vis-à-vis other 
organizational units. In order to test the implications of these procedures on intra-party democracy, this 
paper addresses the candidate selection processes of two parties that rely exclusively on online primaries: 
Podemos and the Five Star Movement. The analysis combines two perspectives: first, it describes the 
rules of candidate selection processes in each party based on party statutes and other party documents, 
and second, it tracks the progression of candidates through all stages of the candidate selection process 
during the 2013 Italian and the 2015 Spanish general elections on the one hand, and the 2014 European 
Parliament elections on the other. Based on these two perspectives, the cases are classified along the 
four dimensions established by Rahat and Hazan (2001): candidacy, selectorate, decentralization and 
voting/appointment systems. The findings indicate that contrary to expectations, the candidate selection 
processes were more tightly controlled in Podemos, primarily through the adoption of block voting 
that favoured lists headed and supported by the party leader. Moreover, Podemos’ lists of candidates 
were substantially modified after the primaries, a pattern not found in M5S. However, due to the tight 
restrictions on eligibility and the lack of availability of information regarding the voting rules applied in 
the candidate selection process, the Five Star Movement scores worse on inclusiveness and transparency, 
which also raises concerns regarding the competitiveness of the contest.
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Primarias en línea y democracia interna en los partidos: 
Los procesos de selección de candidatos en Podemos y el 
Movimiento 5 Estrellas
Resumen
Generalmente, la realización de primarias a través de internet se considera la forma más inclusiva y 
accesible de toma de decisiones en el seno de un partido. Sin embargo, esta apertura también entraña el 
riesgo de reforzar el liderazgo de los partidos frente a otras unidades de la organización. Con la finalidad de 
analizar las implicaciones de estos procedimientos en la democracia interna de los partidos, este artículo 
presenta los procesos de selección de candidatos de dos partidos que realizan sus primarias exclusivamente 
a través de Internet: Podemos y el Movimiento 5 Estrellas. El análisis combina dos perspectivas. En 
primer lugar, describe las reglas de los procesos de selección de candidatos en cada partido basándose 
en los estatutos del partido y otros documentos del partido. En segundo lugar, examina la evolución de 
los candidatos a lo largo de todas las fases del proceso de selección de candidatos durante las elecciones 
generales de 2013 en Italia y del 2015, en España, por un lado, y en las elecciones al Parlamento Europeo 
de 2014, por otro. Partiendo de estas dos perspectivas, se han clasificado los casos en cuatro dimensiones 
establecidas por Rahat y Hazan (2001): candidatura, selectorado, descentralización y sistema de votación 
vs. nombramiento. Los resultados indican que, al contrario de lo que se esperaba, los procesos de selección 
de candidatos estaban más estrictamente controlados en Podemos, principalmente a través de la adopción 
del voto en bloque, que favorecía a las listas encabezadas y apoyadas por el líder del partido. Además, las 
listas de candidatos de Podemos fueron modificadas sustancialmente después de las primarias, una pauta 
que no se ha observado en el M5S. Con todo y con ello, las fuertes restricciones a la elegibilidad y la falta 
de disponibilidad de información sobre las reglas de votación aplicadas en el proceso de selección de los 
candidatos conceden al Movimiento 5 Estrellas una peor puntuación en cuanto a inclusividad y transparen-
cia se refiere, lo que genera inquietud a su vez en cuanto a las garantías de la competencia en la contienda.
Palabras clave
participación en línea, democracia interna partidos, selección candidatos, organización partidos, ciber-
partidos
Tema
política comparada, política partidista, organización partidos
1. Introduction
Candidate selection is universally regarded as one of 
the party activities that are most decisive for intra-party 
democracy (Cross and Katz, 2013; Detterbeck, 2005; Rahat 
et al., 2008, Scarrow, 2015). As such, it constitutes an 
unparalleled research site for analysing intra-party power 
relations between different organizational units within 
political parties (Detterbeck, 2005; Pedersen, 2010). In 
particular, observing the rules and the execution of candidate 
selection processes allows researchers to gain direct insights 
into the relationship between what Katz and Mair’s cartel 
party thesis calls the “three faces” of party organization: 
the party in public office, the party in central office and 
the party on the ground (Katz and Mair, 1993, 1995, 2009). 
Arguably, the use of the Internet in candidate selection 
processes intertwined with a general move towards 
inclusiveness in party decision-making (Faucher, 2015; 
Gauja, 2015) might have an impact on these power relations. 
Such an effect would be most pronounced in organizations 
that Margetts called cyber parties which “use web-based 
technologies to strengthen the relationship between 
voters and party” and offer voters and supporters rights 
traditionally associated with formal membership (Margetts, 
2006, p. 531; Hartleb, 2013). More specifically, due to the 
Eloi Puig
IDP No. 24 (February, 2017) I ISSN 1699-8154 Journal promoted by the Law and Political Science Department
Bálint Mikola
39
www.uoc.edu/idp
Universitat Oberta de Catalunya
Online primaries and intra-party democracy…
lower costs of participation (Bennett and Segerberg, 2013; 
Bimber et al., 2012), online primaries have the potential of 
being both more inclusive and more accessible than offline 
ballots.1 However, whether they realize this potential depends 
on how the voting procedure is designed and executed. At 
the same time, the inclusiveness of intra-party decision-
making can also strengthen the party leadership vis-à-vis 
the party intermediary elites (Carty, 2013; Hopkin, 2001; Mair, 
2002) and thus foster anti-democratic tendencies within 
political parties. Nevertheless, the general interest of this 
paper lies in determining the share of power that online 
primaries grant ordinary party members and supporters, 
i.e. the party on the ground.
Several indicators have been proposed to measure variation 
in the extent to which candidate selection is democratic. 
One influential formulation applies two concepts: inclusion 
(formal eligibility) and access (the procedural costs of voting), 
both of which have a crucial impact on the competitiveness 
of the process (Scarrow 2015, p. 186-187). However, Rahat and 
Hazan (2001) introduced a broader and more comprehensive 
set of indicators that can be used for describing the candidate 
selection process which corresponds more closely with the 
purposes of this paper. Their conceptualization is based on 
four dimensions: candidacy, selectorate, decentralization 
and voting/appointment systems. These dimensions reveal 
answers to the following questions: 1. Who can be selected? 
(candidacy); 2. Who selects candidates? (selectorate); 3. 
Where (at which organizational level) are the candidates 
selected? (decentralization) and 4. How are candidates 
nominated? (voting/appointment systems) (Rahat and Hazan 
2001, p. 298-299). The candidacy dimension is measured on 
a scale ranging from inclusiveness to exclusiveness, and in 
that sense it overlaps with Scarrow’s (2015) inclusiveness 
indicator. However, Rahat and Hazan’s taxonomy makes 
a distinction between passive (candidacy) and active 
(selectorate) voting rights, both of which can be measured 
on an inclusiveness scale, albeit with different categories, 
which allow for more combinations. These combinations 
are graphically illustrated in Graph 1.
 1.  As Rahat and Hazan (2001, p. 302) note: “Levels of accessibility and inclusiveness are higher if a party adopts such methods as postal 
ballots, tele-voting or spreading polling stations all over the country”. It seems logical to hold the same assumption with regards to online 
voting, which is yet another technical innovation that facilitates participation.
Graph 1. Inclusiveness/exclusiveness along the dimesions of candidacy and selectorate
Graph adopted from Rahat and Hazan (2001, p. 304). Empirical examples were removed from the original graph, as they do not serve the 
purposes of the current discussion.
Party Members 
+ Additional 
Requirements
Party Members
All Citizens
Electorate Party 
Members
Selected 
Party Agency
Non-Selected 
Party Agency
Party 
Leader
Inclusiveness
Exclusiveness
C 
A 
N 
D 
I 
D 
A 
C 
Y
SELECTORATE
Eloi Puig
IDP No. 24 (February, 2017) I ISSN 1699-8154 Journal promoted by the Law and Political Science Department
Bálint Mikola
40
www.uoc.edu/idp
Universitat Oberta de Catalunya
Online primaries and intra-party democracy…
With regards to decentralization, Rahat and Hazan distinguish 
between functional and territorial decentralization. While 
this is a theoretically sound proposition, this paper can 
only benefit from the latter as none of the cases addressed 
here organize representation based on social/professional/
sectorial subunits.2 In terms of territorial decentralization, 
cases can be distinguished on the basis of whether 
candidates are selected at the local, the regional or the 
national level.
Finally, candidate selection processes can be distinguished 
based on the voting procedures they apply. In Rahat and 
Hazan’s (2001) terminology, the procedures applied only 
constitute a pure voting system if 1. all of the candidates are 
only determined by votes, not a majoritarian or unanimous 
approval of closed lists, and 2. voting results are officially 
presented in order to provide legitimacy. Procedures at the 
other extreme can be defined as “appointment systems”, 
while in-between cases where for instance en bloc voting 
for pre-established lists is allowed constitute “appointment-
voting systems” (Rahat and Hazan, 2001, p.  306). I 
suggest that calling these latter systems “mixed” is more 
practical (as shown in Table 1). Nevertheless, the use of an 
intermediate category will be crucial for our cases. Voting 
systems can be further differentiated using two parameters. 
According to the rules for the allocation of positions, we can 
distinguish between proportional (PR), semi-proportional 
(semi-PR), semi-majoritarian and majoritarian systems. 
Furthermore, voting procedures can be categorized on the 
basis of whether they select all of the candidates in one 
or multiple rounds. For a comprehensive summary of all 
logically possible combinations of appointment and voting 
systems, see Table 1.
2. Data collection strategy
The analysis presented below rests on two main sources of 
data: first, the regulation of candidate selection processes 
in party statutes and other party documents, and second, 
publicly available data on the actual execution of primaries, 
including lists of candidates, online discussions about the 
process and media coverage of these events. With regards 
to this second stream of data, I have compiled a dataset 
on the last Italian and Spanish general elections (of 2013 
and 2015, respectively) and the 2014 European Parliament 
 2.   Although Podemos acknowledges such functional subunits (the so called “Círculos Sectoriales”), their role in the candidate selection 
process is marginal.
Table 1. Appointment systems and voting systems
Category (Rahat and Hazan 2001) Sub-category Category (recoded by author)
Appointment systems
Pure Appointment
With en bloc ratification
Mixed
Appointment-voting systems With ratification and correction possibilities
Voting systems
One-round Majoritarian
Voting
Multi-round Majoritarian
One-round Semi-majoritarian
Multi-round Semi-majoritarian
One-round Semi-PR
Multi-round Semi-PR
One-round PR
Multi-round PR
Table adopted from Rahat and Hazan (2001, p. 308) extended by the author.
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elections. At the same time, data on the selection of 
candidates for local and regional elections appear to be 
more difficult to access; however, obtaining them might 
be a feasible way of extending the scope of the findings 
presented here.
In the following sections, I will first present the rules and 
procedures each party adopted for the execution of their 
candidate selection processes. Then, using my own data, 
I will demonstrate to what extent their results favoured 
the party leadership vis-à-vis the party on the ground. 
Finally, I will evaluate these procedures as well as their 
results using the four dimensions presented above. The 
findings are not only relevant for determining the share 
of power held by party members, but also because the 
ways MPs are selected have an impact on their legislative 
behaviour: the more open and democratic the contest is, 
the more autonomous and competitive MPs are expected 
to be, whilst strong control of the party leadership over 
the process entails loyalty to the official party line (Katz, 
2001; Pinto and Pedrazzani, 2015; Rahat and Hazan 
2001). However, my primary interest lies in deducing to 
what extent neopopulist parties’3 claims of revitalizing 
intra-party democracy are substantiated based on their 
candidate selection practices.
3.  The online primaries of the Five 
Star Movement
3.1.  Regulation of primaries
Beppe Grillo’s M5S was the first party in Italy to introduce 
online primaries to select its candidates for the 2013 general 
election. However, formal regulations of the candidate 
selection process in party documents are very succinct, a 
feature that is in line with the Five Star Movement’s self-
definition as an anti-/non-political party that defies such 
regulations. This ethos is reflected in the party’s “non-
statute”, a document that consists of merely five pages 
divided into seven articles (MoVimento 5 Stelle, 2009). 
Article 7 specifies that:
On occasions of, and in preparation for, electoral consultations 
[…], the M5S will constitute the center of collection of 
candidatures and the vehicle for the selection of those subjects 
who will be authorized, on each occasion and in writing, to 
use the name and symbol ‘MoVimento 5 Stelle’ in the setting 
of their participation in each electoral consultation. […] The 
identity of candidates for each elective office will be publicized 
on a dedicated website created within the framework of the 
blog; discussions regarding such candidatures will likewise be 
public, transparent and unmediated. The rules concerning the 
procedure of candidature and designation for national or local 
electoral consultations may be more precisely determined in 
accordance with the type of consultation and in the light of the 
experience that will be gained over time. (MoVimento 5 Stelle 
2009, translation adopted from Pinto and Pedrazzani, 2015)
This latter point is especially relevant in the sense that 
M5S primaries have indeed been regulated in an ad hoc 
fashion: new regulations have been published on Beppe 
Grillo’s blog (the only recognized platform through which 
the party operates) before each voting procedure, each with 
its own distinct set of rules. In the case of the primaries for 
the 2013 general election dubbed “Parlamentarie”, potential 
candidates were required to be members of the Five Star 
Movement, to be at least 25 years old,4 not to be members 
of any other political party, not to have served in public 
office for two electoral cycles and not to have a criminal 
record (MoVimento 5 Stelle, 2012; Pinto and Pedrazzani, 
2015, p. 106). Voters were also required to be members of 
M5S, and only those were eligible to vote who registered on 
the party’s website before 30 September 2012, i.e. more than 
two months before the primaries took place (ibid.). Based 
on these requirements, the candidate selection process of 
M5S can be described as rather exclusive.
The regulation of the primaries for the 2014 European 
Parliament elections differed from the “Parlamentarie” in 
that the candidates were selected in two rounds: first on 
a regional level, then according to the five constituencies 
that are applied in the selection of Italian MEPs. Voters 
could cast three preferences in each round, and the winner 
of the first round in each region already secured his or 
her place on the final list of candidates. A fixed number of 
 3.  Both parties can be called populist as they apply “populist strategies” (i.e. top-down mobilization against the established political elites) 
to build mass support and advocate populist ideologies that divide societies into two antagonistic camps; “the virtuous people and some 
corrupt elites” (Kriesi, 2014, p. 5).
 4.  This minimum age is a constitutional requirement in order to be eligible for the Italian Chamber of Deputies.
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the top rated candidates5 in the second round would also 
appear on the final list of candidates in alphabetical order. 
Both candidates and voters had to meet strict requirements. 
Potential candidates were expected to have been enrolled 
in M5S prior to 31 December 2012 (the primaries took place 
on 1 April 2014), not to hold elected office, and not to have 
run or have a pending request to run for local elections in 
2014. Voters had to be enrolled in the party by 30 June 2013 
(i.e. nine months before the primaries) and not to have their 
membership suspended by 20 March 2014 (MoVimento 5 
Stelle, 2014a).
3.2.  M5S primaries in practice
Despite the apparent differences in their regulations, the 
two primaries yielded similar results, at least in numerical 
terms. In the case of the 2012 primaries, the voting was 
organized in correspondence with the 27 electoral districts 
and each voter had the opportunity to cast three preferences 
(Pinto and Pedrazzani, 2015). According to Beppe Grillo’s 
official blog, the “Parlamentarie” involved a total of 1,400 
candidates who received 95,000 votes from 32,000 voters 
(Grillo, 2012a). While prominent party representatives widely 
regarded these participation rates as “historic” (Capasso, 
2012), these figures are quite modest in relation to the 
party’s self-declared 255,339 members reported in the 
same month (Grillo, 2012b). The previous figure entails that 
only 12.53% of M5S members participated in the primaries 
for the 2013 general elections. However, if one takes into 
account the unreliability of objective (i.e. self-declared) party 
membership data (Scarrow, 2015, Van Haute and Gauja, 
2015), the participation rate of actual members might have 
been higher.
In the 2013 general election, the Five Star Movement 
achieved its best electoral results so far: with 25.5% of 
the votes it won 109 seats in the Chamber of Deputies and 
54 in the Senate, becoming the second and third largest 
group in the two institutions, respectively. All of the elected 
MPs were selected through online primaries and there were 
no modifications in the candidacies, although the order of 
the candidates did change in relation to the order based 
on the number of votes they received. More interestingly, 
the size and the composition of the M5S parliamentary 
group have changed significantly since 2013, mostly as a 
result of defections and expulsions. At the same time, this 
finding should not be interpreted as an indication of the 
candidate selection process being undemocratic but rather 
as a symptom of low institutionalization of the party and 
the underprivileged position the party in public office enjoys 
as opposed to the two other faces of M5S (Katz and Mair, 
1995, 2009; Tronconi, 2015).
With regards to the candidate selection process, most 
concerns were related to the issue of transparency. A former 
councillor of the party in Bologna, Federica Salsi, who had 
previously been expelled from M5S because of criticizing 
the party for its lack of internal democracy, expressed these 
concerns in the form of twenty questions which went viral 
on the Internet (Collevecchio, 2012). The questions revealed 
uncertainty about the way sensitive data related to voting 
were managed, the lack of publicly available detailed 
information on the results of the primaries (Grillo published 
only rounded figures on his blog, see Grillo, 2012a), and the 
lack of regulations referring to how and by which organ of 
the party disputes over contested results should be resolved 
(Collevecchio, 2012).
In the case of the primaries for the 2014 European Parliament 
elections, reported participation figures were very similar 
to those of the “Parlamentarie”: in the first round, a total 
of 5,091 candidates were presented for whom 35,188 M5S 
members cast 92,877 votes (MoVimento 5 Stelle, 2014b), 
whilst in the second round 33,000 voters expressed 91,245 
preferences for the 112 candidates that emerged from the 
first round (MoVimento 5 Stelle, 2014c). With regards to 
the results, M5S became the second most voted party in 
Italy with 21.15% of the vote which yielded 17 seats in the 
European Parliament.
3.3.  The M5S online primaries in light of  
the four dimensions
After having described the rules as well as the results of the 
most important candidate selection processes within the Five 
Star Movement, I now turn to categorizing these procedures 
using the four analytical dimensions developed by Rahat 
 5.  30 candidates for the North West constituency, 18 for North East, 20 for the Centre, 24 for the South and 20 for the islands of Sardinia 
and Sicily (MoVimento 5 Stelle, 2014a).
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and Hazan (2001): candidacy, selectorate, decentralization 
and voting/appointment system.
In terms of candidacy, the processes described above 
clearly represent the exclusive end of the spectrum: not 
only membership is required but also the time of enrolment 
is fixed. Furthermore, would-be candidates who served in 
elected office for two cycles or more were also ruled out. 
However, as seen in Graph 1, with regards to the selectorate, 
allowing all members to vote brings M5S closer to the 
inclusive end of the continuum. Nevertheless, this might be 
a somewhat misleading interpretation as similar restrictions 
(time of enrolment) also apply to voters, which is more 
restricted than a typical scenario in which all members can 
vote irrespective of when they joined the party.
Decentralization is a delicate matter in M5S: whereas the 
candidates emanate from and are elected on the basis 
of regional constituencies, lists of candidates need to be 
approved by the party in central office, i.e. Grillo and his 
staff. This mechanism is also inherent in the party’s non-
statute: Beppe Grillo is the sole owner of the name and the 
symbol of the movement, and thus can unilaterally grant or 
withdraw permission to use them (Bordignon and Ceccarini, 
2013). Thus, while it may seem partially decentralized on a 
territorial (regional) level, the candidate selection of M5S 
is closer to a centralized model. Finally, the voting system 
applied in the Five Star Movement’s online primaries is a 
semi-proportional one in which the number of votes each 
selector is granted (3) is lower than the number of safe seats 
contested (Rahat and Hazan 2001, p. 307).
In sum, the online primaries of M5S display some contradictory 
features: although candidacy is extremely exclusive, the 
selectorate is relatively wide; regional representation 
is present but controlled by the centre, and the voting 
system applied is closer to proportional than to majoritarian 
systems, but the number of votes per elector is restricted.
4.  The online primaries  
of Podemos
4.1. Regulation of primaries
Although for an external observer it might seem that online 
primaries are the bread and butter of Podemos, its crucial 
position is not reflected in the party’s “organizational 
document” (Documento organizativo, Podemos, 2015a), nor 
in its official statute (Podemos, 2015c). According to these 
documents, it is the competence of the Citizen Assembly6 
to “elaborate, through a process of open primaries, the 
electoral lists for public offices (from the first until the 
last candidate of the list) for the institutions of national 
representation” (Podemos 2015a, Article 13/a/2). The same 
corresponds to territorial Citizen Assemblies for institutions 
at the regional and local level (Podemos, 2015a, Article 
33/2). The way primaries are executed is not specified in 
these documents.
To address this hiatus, Podemos adopted a distinct 12-page 
regulation for the primaries of the 2015 general election, 
which established the details of the candidate selection 
process (Podemos, 2015b).7 In order to vote, party supporters 
needed to be registered with Podemos.8 The deadline for 
registration entailing a right to vote was determined by the 
party’s Electoral Commission, a supervisory organ whose 
members are ratified by the Citizen Council9 on the proposal 
of the Secretary General (i.e. the party leader). Unlike in 
the case of M5S, this deadline was highly permissive: 
voters could register until 10 am on 16 July 2015, while the 
primaries took place from 17 until 22 July. The voting system 
was differentiated: 1. the party’s presidential candidate was 
selected in a single constituency and voters could only 
cast one vote; 2. candidates for the lower chamber of the 
parliament (Congreso de los Diputados) were also selected 
in a single constituency, using a voting system in which all 
voters could express from 1 to 350 preferences,10 the latter 
 6.  The Citizen Assembly is the supreme decision-making body of Podemos in which all members have a right to participate (Podemos, 2015a).
 7.  To the author’s knowledge, no such specific regulation was adopted for the primaries that preceded the European Parliamentary elections, 
save a presentation on Prezi.com.
 8.  Initially, Podemos emphasized registration as a kind of “light membership” or supporter status. However, the distinction between members 
and “inscritos” (registered party supporters) could not be maintained under Spanish party law. Thus, current “inscritos” are notified on 
Podemos’ webpage that by submitting their application form, they become members of Podemos as a political party.
 9.  The Citizen Council is the main executive organ of Podemos, whose 62 members are selected by the Citizen Assembly (Podemos, 2015a).
 10.  The system used by Podemos was different from single transferable vote (STV) systems in that preferences were not ordered (Podemos, 
2015b, Article 4).
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being the total number of deputies; and 3. candidates for 
the Senate were selected based on regional constituencies 
(autonomous communities), in which all voters could express 
from one to as many preferences as the number of seats 
assigned to their region (Podemos, 2015b, Article 4).
Unlike voters, candidates were not required to be party 
members, only to be over 18. Candidates for the post 
of Secretary General could simultaneously also run for 
candidacy to the Congress of Deputies or the Senate. 
However, simultaneous candidacies for the Congress of 
Deputies and the Senate were ruled out (Podemos, 2015b, 
Article 5). Individual candidates as well as integrated lists 
of candidates (ranging from 50 to 350 candidates) could 
be presented at the primaries. Members of lists were not 
allowed to also run individually. In case of voting for lists, 
voters could select the whole list as well as one or several 
of its components. Voters could also combine preferences 
for individual candidates with preferences for lists within 
the allocation of their 1 to 350 votes.
All of the candidates needed to be licensed11 by either one of 
the Círculos12 or by one of the elected organs of the party13 
in order to ensure that they conform to the ethical and 
organizational principles of the party. In light of the results 
of the primaries, the final list of candidates was assembled 
based on the number of votes each candidate received, with 
the caveat that gender inequalities were to be compensated 
in a way that successive candidates alternate by gender 
(also known as the “zipper system”).
As the primaries were held in one state-wide constituency 
which does not correspond to the 52 provincial constituencies 
whose lists can be voted for at Spanish general elections, 
the resulting list was transformed into provincial lists of 
candidates as follows: the most voted candidate could select 
the provincial list on which he/she wanted to run as well as 
his/her position on that list, a process that was repeated by 
each successive candidate. The regulation also prescribed 
that in exceptional cases, pacts made with other political 
formations by the “directive organs” of Podemos can limit 
the availability of posts, a possibility that needs to be 
communicated to all candidates by the Electoral Commission 
(Podemos, 2015b, Article 7.2).
4.2.  Podemos primaries in practice
The primaries for the 2014 EP elections were the first 
candidate selection process Podemos engaged in, shortly 
after its foundation in January 2014. Thus, the procedures 
applied had been far less sophisticated and regulated 
then they were during the 2015 primaries. Candidacies 
were presented individually and each candidate had to 
gain support from one of the Círculos (base units). All the 
“Circles” could support three candidates at most. Voters 
were not required to be members of Podemos (which 
was only registered as a political party 16 days before the 
primaries started), only to be Spanish citizens aged 16 or 
over.
During the seven days of the primaries, approximately 33,000 
individuals cast their votes for the party’s 145 candidates. 
Each individual could express one preference for the head 
of the list and five preferences for other candidates. Online 
voting was facilitated by the Agora Voting application, and 
for one day offline voting was also possible, although its 
reach was geographically limited (Riveiro, 2014). The first 
54 places on the list (which corresponds to the number of 
Spanish MEPs) were reordered in order to ensure gender 
balance. Therefore, the fifth most voted candidate, Miguel 
Urbán Crespo, was replaced by Lola Sánchez and did not 
get one of the five mandates Podemos won. Interestingly, 
out of the 5 Podemos MEPs selected in 2014, four had 
already resigned by January 2016 to run for positions in 
Spain. At the same time, they were all replaced by successive 
candidates from the original list, in line with the preferences 
party sympathizers expressed at the primaries.
The voting procedures of the primaries for the 2015 
general election triggered many more controversies both 
internally and externally, above all because of the adoption 
of closed lists and the possibility of voting “en plancha” (i.e. 
to approve a whole list without expressing any individual 
 11.  The regulation (Podemos, 2015b, Article 6) uses the Spanish verb “avalar”, whose meaning is closer to “support”. However, the regulation 
also states explicitly that “avalar” “does not entail support for a candidate”, only acknowledgement that the candidate conforms to the 
requirements established by Podemos.
 12.  The smallest local or professional groups that are the base units of Podemos.
 13.  It is important to note that due to this condition, the Citizen Assembly could not license/support candidates, as it is not an elected body.
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preferences). Although voters were given the opportunity 
to select only a few candidates from a list and combine 
it with preferences for individual candidates, the results 
of this procedure were extremely skewed towards the list 
supported by the party leader, Pablo Iglesias. Numerically, 
only three of the 65 selected candidates (4.6 %) following 
Pablo Iglesias were not identical to the ones on his list, which 
underscores criticisms claiming that the candidate selection 
process was strongly dominated by the party leader and 
thus not truly competitive. In terms of participation, 59,723 
members expressed their preferences, which represented 
a mere 15.52% of the total membership.
Another practice that raised concerns about the democratic 
nature of the candidate selection was that of making 
alliances with other political actors and the nomination of 
external candidates, the so-called “fichajes”. Although this 
was previously authorized by the membership14 and included 
in the regulations of the primaries (Podemos, 2015b), it has 
led to drastic changes in the final list of candidates. Out of 
the 75 candidates presented by Podemos at the general 
election, 30 (i.e., 40%) were not selected in the primaries 
but derived from regional alliances in Catalonia (En Comú 
Podem), Valencia (Compromís-Podemos-És el Moment) 
and Galicia (En Marea). From a different perspective, out 
of the 69 mandates won by Podemos and its allies, 27 
(39.1%) were not directly approved by Podemos members 
in primaries (Manetto, 2015) but instead were selected using 
the mechanisms prescribed by the respective territorial 
partner organizations.
4.3.  Podemos primaries in light of the four 
dimensions
As in the case of the Five Star Movement, the following 
section will evaluate the candidate selection processes of 
Podemos based on the four analytical dimensions of Rahat 
and Hazan (2001).
In terms of candidacy, Podemos was and until now has 
remained extremely inclusive: candidates are not required 
to be party members as long as they are supported by 
one of the party organs or organizational units defined in 
the corresponding regulations. However, with regards to 
the inclusiveness of the selectorate, it has changed over 
time: while all citizens above the age of 16 could vote for 
the candidates for the 2014 EP elections, in 2015 this 
option was only available for those who were registered 
with Podemos, which technically and according to Spanish 
party law equals party members only. This is still closer 
to the inclusive end of the scale, but one could describe 
the evolution of the selectorate as backsliding towards 
traditional party models.
Podemos scores even worse on decentralization which is 
almost totally absent from its candidate selection processes, 
save the requirement that candidates can also be licensed 
by local base units (but by other, non-territorial organs 
too) and the election of candidates to the Senate which by 
definition is based on territorial representation. Even the 
selection of provincial candidates is based on one state-
wide constituency, and the way candidates later select the 
constituencies where they would like to run for office is also 
not tied to any territorial principle.15
With regards to the voting/appointment system dimension, 
Podemos’s primaries for the 2015 general election were a 
textbook example of Rahat and Hazan’s (2001) in-between 
or “Appointment-Voting Systems” category, in which “model 
lists” are established by some party agency which are then 
subjected to en bloc voting. However, the process used 
before the EP elections was a pure voting system in which 
only gender imbalances were compensated for. Based on 
the position allocation formula, the voting system used in 
2014 can be described as semi-proportional (fewer votes/
person than safe seats contested) while the one applied in 
2015 was a proportional system, both of which were based 
on one single constituency. In sum, it is not difficult to 
observe a gradual move in Podemos from inclusive towards 
more exclusive practices, especially regarding the use of 
closed lists and the extension of the selectorate. Table 2 
summarizes the main empirical findings for both parties.
 14.  Party members were asked whether they would authorize the Citizen Council of the party to make alliances with “different political 
actors” at the regional or inferior levels with the condition that in case such alliances were made, the name “Podemos” would always 
appear first on the voting sheets (e.g. Podemos – name of other party). However, potential partners were not specified in the wording of 
the question.
 15.  Podemos explicitly supports transforming the electoral system so that constituencies correspond to the 17 autonomous communities and 
2 autonomous municipalities instead of the 52 provinces (Podemos, 2016).
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Table 2. The candidate selection processes of the Five Star Movement (M5S) and Podemos in light of the four analytical 
dimensions
Analytical dimension Five Star Movement Podemos
Candidacy Exclusive (membership required, time of enrolment fixed) Inclusive (membership not required)
Selectorate Inclusive, with restrictions (membership required, time of enrolment fixed)
Inclusive, with restrictions (membership required, time 
of enrolment fixed, but highly permissive)
Decentralization Regional (with the central party administration retaining some control)
National (primaries based on one statewide 
constituency)
Voting/appointment system Pure voting system, semi-proportional representation (limited vote system)
Appointment-voting system, semi-proportional (2014) 
and proportional (2015) representation
As seen in Table 2, the eligibility criteria for candidates 
(labelled as candidacy) are higher in the Five Star Movement, 
whereas the two parties impose similar requirements on 
the selectorate, although the date of registration is much 
more flexible in Podemos. Based on these two criteria, the 
candidate selection processes of Podemos can be classified 
as more inclusive, which also presumes a greater share of 
power granted to the party on the ground. At the same time, 
the organization of candidate selection processes is more 
decentralized in Beppe Grillo’s party and the vote choices 
are not as clearly dominated by the party leader as in the 
case of Pablo Iglesias’s lists. However, the indirect influence 
of the unofficial party leader over the selection of potential 
candidates might similarly distort the outcome in M5S. 
Thus, further research is needed to determine the impact 
of decentralization and the voting/appointment system on 
intra-party democracy.
5.  Conclusion and implications  
for future research
As the sections above have demonstrated, the candidate 
selection processes of both parties are mixed and feature 
elements that reveal undemocratic tendencies. Two of 
these elements are common: the restriction of the right to 
vote to party members only and the high level of control 
that the party leadership retains over the composition of 
lists of candidates. The particular methods for exercising 
control differ: Beppe Grillo retains the right to unilaterally 
grant or withdraw permission to use the party’s symbols 
in electoral campaigns if he finds that a candidate does 
not act in line with the party’s principles, while in Podemos 
the party leader secures his own preferred candidates by 
compiling lists of candidates backed by himself. The first 
is a legalistic approach, while the second is based on the 
resources owned by Pablo Iglesias in terms of popularity, 
media coverage, rhetorical skills and the undisputable 
nature of his leadership that the former resources entail.
On the other hand, while few would doubt that online voting 
is more accessible than its offline counterparts, participation 
rates as well as the absolute number of participants are far 
from impressive in either of the two parties. Some of this 
could be attributed to the exclusive nature of the selectorate 
(although that would not explain low participation rates 
among members). Nevertheless, the fact that even the 
extremely open 2014 primaries of Podemos for the EP 
elections did not attract more than 33,000 people in a 
period when the political engagement of Spaniards reached 
unprecedented heights is intriguing. Similarly puzzling is 
the use of rounded figures such as the previous one when 
publishing the results of some of these primaries, which 
raises concerns about the reliability of these data.
This paper has also demonstrated that online candidate 
selection processes can be fruitfully categorized using Rahat 
and Hazan’s (2001) four analytical dimensions. Further 
thought should be given to whether these indicators could 
be refined in ways that would make it easier to quantify 
them or at least make them more sensitive to variation 
by way of including additional categories. At the same 
time, future research on candidate selection for local and 
regional elections could yield further insights, especially on 
the effects of decentralization.
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